Books of Interest
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Conquering Crises (Ten Lessons to Learn Before You Need Them)
By: Admiral William H. McRaven
Narrated By: Willaim H. McRaven
William H. McRaven (Author, retired four-star admiral in the U.S. Navy, ninth commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014, commanded special operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.)
Wisdom does not always come with experience or age. Though born in 1955, William McRaven spent 40 years as a special operations officer in the U.S. Navy. He retired from military service and became chancellor of the University of Texas System from 2015-2018. Now, as a writer, McRaven offers some insightful advice to those who manage others in response to crises. He offers his personal, corporate, and institutional experience as a crises’ manager.
Though McRaven’s experience comes from a military system of command, he offers a listen, learn, and plan approach to getting things done through others.
When faced with a reported crisis, he notes the first information one receives is usually inaccurate and misleading. He offers numerous examples like Pearl Harbor in 1941, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and Covid-19 in the 21st century. The first reports of those crises were misleading and were found to be much more consequential and damaging than originally reported. The first step when faced with a crisis is to be sure of the facts. McRaven generally discounts first reports. He suggests one should confirm details from personal observation (if possible or practicable). If one cannot investigate facts of a crises personally, one must confirm details from other sources that are at, subject to, or near the crisis. The point is not to act on first reports but to seek more information.
McRaven receives a phone call in the middle of the night about a mistaken Taliban sympathizer carrying a weapon who is shot and killed by an American soldier during America’s intervention in Afghanistan.
It was found he was not a sympathizer but a cousin of the President of Afghanistan. McRaven calls General Petraeus in the middle of the night to report the incident. Petraeus thanks McRaven for contacting him immediately rather than waiting until the morning. Both recognize the urgency of the crises. They discuss details of what happened and plan a response. McRaven is ordered to contact the President of Afghanistan immediately to explain what happened and offer American support for the family of the murdered cousin. McRaven’s point is know the facts of a crises, create a plan to address what is known, react as quickly as the correct facts are known, plan a response agreed upon by those in authority, and act (as soon as possible) according to plan.
Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.
A more complicated crisis noted by McRaven is also in Afghanistan. America’s ambassador to Afghanistan meets with McRaven to tell him the special forces reporting to him in Afghanistan are alienating local Afghan citizens with their military actions against the Taliban. The ambassador tells McRaven his operations are alienating Afghani citizens to the point of losing America’s war against the Taliban. The meeting becomes heated because McRaven believes his command is doing a great job of pacifying Taliban attacks on local citizens. Rather than acting like an ostrich with its head in the sand, McRaven calls for a meeting of colonels in the Afghanistan theater to investigate the Ambassador’s accusation. The team McRaven assembles finds the Ambassador’s concerns are justified. Though peaceful coexistence appeared to be improved with McRaven’s special forces’ actions, the alienation of Afghani’s was growing. As has been written by other authors, America’s special forces often acted based on one Afghani family’s personal anger at another family rather than for any concern about Taliban activity.
The group of colonels assembled by McRaven developed a plan to more judiciously act on alleged Taliban activity from Afghan informants.
Of course, America’s ignominious departure from Afghanistan, implies McRaven’s response was too little and too late. This is not to argue that McRaven’s response was wrong but only that the plan did not stop Taliban resurgence. The valid point McRaven is making is that one should systematically address a crisis, create a plan once the facts are known, and execute the plan. Obviously, not all crises are successfully resolved. In the case of America’s intervention in Afghanistan, McRaven’s plan may not have been right for the facts that were gathered, or the crises was just too culturally complex for a successfully executed response.
McRaven comes across as a highly competent leader and manager in a crises.
Where one may have reservations about any leader’s role in a crisis is whether they agree on the facts. McRaven believes it is right to assassinate a proven terrorist who has killed innocent people. That kind of decision goes beyond the principles of McRaven’s book about response to crises. “Judge not, lest ye be judged” is alleged to have been said by Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount.
McRaven believes assassination is justified.
In Ukraine and Gaza, innocents are being killed every day. There is no religious, nationalist, or political justification for killing of innocents but the history of the world shows we are all killers. In a crisis, you would want someone like McRaven to be the “beauty on duty”, but one must ask oneself if assassination is ever justified.
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